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THE FIRST PRINCIPLE OF
PRACTICAL REASON:
A Commentary on the Summa theologiae, 1-2,
Question 94, Article 2
Many proponents and critics of Thomas Aquinas's theory of natural law
have understood it roughly as follows. The first principle of practical reason
is a command: Do good and avoid evil. Man discovers this imperative in his
conscience; it is like an inscription written there by the hand of God. Having
become aware of this basic commandment, man consults his nature to see what
is good and what is evil. He examines an action in comparison with his essence
to see whether the action fits human nature or does not fit it. If the action fits,
it is seen to be good; if it does not fit, it is seen to be bad. Once we know that
a certain kind of action - for instance, stealing - is bad, we have two premises,
"Avoid evil" and "Stealing is evil," from whose conjunction is deduced:
"Avoid stealing." All specific commandments of natural law are derived in this
way. 1
I propose fo show how far this interpretation misses Aquinas's real position.
My main purpose is not to contribute to the history of natural law, but to clarify
Aquinas's idea of it for current thinking. Instead of undertaking a general
review of Aquinas's entire natural law theory, I shall focus on the first principle
of practical reason, which also is the first precept of natural law. This principle,
2
as Aquinas states it, is: Good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided.
Although verbally this formula is only slightly different from that of the command, Do good and avoid evil, I shall try to show that the two formulae differ
considerably in meaning and that they belong in different theoretical contexts.
This paper has five parts. 1) Since I propose to show that the common
interpretation is unsound, it will be necessary to explicate the text in which
Aquinas states the first principle. 2) Since the mistaken interpretation restricts
the meaning of "good" and "evil" in the first principle to the value of moral
actions, the meaning of these key terms must be clarified in the light of Aquinas's
theory of final causality. 3) Since the mistaken interpretation tends to oppose
the commandments of natural law to positive action, it will help to notice the
broad scope Aquinas attributes to the first principle, for he considers it to be a
source, rather than a limit, of action. 4) Since according to the mistaken interpretation natural law is a set of imperatives, it is important to see why the first
principle is not primarily an imperative, although it is a genuine precept. 5)
Since the mistaken interpretation regards all specific precepts of natural law as
1 This summary is not intended to reflect the position of any particular author. However, a full and accessible presentation along these general lines may be found in THOMAS
J. HIGGINS, S.J., MAN AS MAN:

THE SCIENCE AND ART OF ETHICS 49-69, 88-100, 120-

126 (rev. ed., Milwaukee, 1958).
2 "Bonum est faciendum et prosequendum,

et malum vitandum." SUMMA THFOLOGIAE
(SUMMA THEOLOOIAE will hereafter be

1-2. q. 94, a. 2, c. (Leonine ed., Rome, 1882-1948).
referred to as S.T.)
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conclusions drawn from the first principle, the significance of Aquinas's actual
view-that there are many self-evident principles of natural law- must be
considered.
I

Aquinas's statement of the first principle of practical reason occurs in Summa
theologiae, 1-2, question 94, article 2. Question 90 is concerned with what law
is, question 91 with the distinction among the various modes of law, and question
92 with the effects of law. Aquinas begins treating each mode of law in particular in question 93; in that question he treats eternal law. Thus he comes to
the study of natural law in question 94. Questions 95 to 97 are concerned with
man-made law. Questions 98 to 108 examine the divine law, Old and New.
Question 94 is divided into six articles, each of which presents a position
on a single issue concerning the law of nature. The first article raises the issue:
"Whether natural law is a habit." Aquinas holds that natural law consists of
precepts of reason, which are analogous to propositions of theoretical knowledge.
Hence he denies that it is a habit, although he grants that it can be possessed
habitually, for one has these principles even when he is not thinking of them.
The second issue raised in question 94 logically follows. It is: "Does natural
law contain many precepts, or only one?" Unlike the issue of the first article,
which was a question considered by many previous authors, this second point
was not a standard issue. 3 For this reason the arguments, which Aquinas sets
out at the beginning of the article in order to construct the issue he wants to
resolve, do not refer to authorities, as the opening arguments of his articles
usually do. Three arguments are set out for the position that natural law
contains only one precept, and a single opposing argument is given to show
that it contains many precepts.
The first argument concludes that natural law must contain only a single
precept on the grounds that law itself is a precept 4 and that natural law has
unity. The second argument reaches the same conclusion by reasoning that since
natural law is based upon human nature, it could have many precepts only if
the many parts of human nature were represented in it; but in this case even
the demands of man's lower nature would have to be reflected in natural law.
The third argument for the position that natural law has only one precept is
drawn from the premises that human reason is one and that law belongs to
reason. 5 The single argument Aquinas offers for the opposite conclusion is
s Paul-M. van Overbeke, O.P., La loi naturelle et le droit naturel selon S. Thomas,
65 REvUE THO ISTE 73-75 (1957) puts q. 94, a. 1 into its proper perspective. ODoN
LOTTIN, O.S.B., LE DROrr NATUREL CHEZ SAINT THOMAS D'AQUIN ET SES PRfI)ECESSEURS
79 (2nd ed., Bruges, 1931) mentions that the issue of the second article had been posed

by Albert the Great (cf. p. 118), but the question was not a commonplace. Obviously
no one could ask it who did not hold that natural law consists of precepts, and even
those who took this position would not ask about the unity or multiplicity of precepts
unless they saw some significance in responding one way or the other.
4A position Aquinas develops in q. 92, a. 2, and applies in rejecting the position that
natural law is a habit in q. 94, a. 1.
5 That law pertains to reason is a matter of definition for Aquinas; law is an ordinance
of reason, according to the famous definition of q. 90, a. 4.

NATURAL LAW FORUM
based on an analogy between the precepts of natural law and the axioms of
demonstrations: as there is a multiplicity of indemonstrable principles of demonstrations, so there is a multiplicity of precepts of natural law. These four initial
arguments serve only to clarify the issue to be resolved in the response which
follows. Of themselves, they settle nothing. After the response Aquinas comments briefly on each of the first three arguments in the light of his resolution
of the issue. The argument that there are many precepts of natural law Aquinas
will not comment upon, since he takes this position himself.
Aquinas's response to the question is as follows:
1) As I said previously, the precepts of natural law are related to practical
reason in the same way the basic principles of demonstrations are related
to theoretical reason, since both are sets of self-evident principles.
2) But something is called "self-evident" in two senses: in one way, objectively; in the other way, relative to us. Any proposition may be called
"objectively self-evident" if its predicate belongs to the intelligibility of its
subject. Yet to someone who does not know the intelligibility of the subject, such a proposition will not be self-evident. For example, the proposition, Man is rational, taken just in itself, is self-evident, for to say man is to
say rational;yet to someone who did not know what man is, this proposition
would not be self-evident. Consequently, as Boethius says in his De hebdomadibus, 6 there are certain axioms or propositions which are generally selfevident to everyone. In this class are propositions whose terms everyone
understands -for example: Every whole is greater than its parts, and: Two
things equal to a third are equal to one another. But there are other propositions which are self-evident only to the educated, who understand what
the terms of such propositions mean. For example, to one who understands
that angels are incorporeal, it is self-evident that they are not in a place
by filling it up, but this is not evident to the uneducated, who do not comprehend this point.
3) Now among those things which fall within the grasp of everyone there
is a certain order of precedence. For that which primarily falls within one's
grasp is being, and the understanding of being is included in absolutely everything that anyone grasps. Hence the primary indemonstrable principle is:
To affirm and simultaneously to deny is excluded. This principle is based
on the intelligibility of being (and nonbeing), and all7 other principles are
based on this one, as Aristotle says in the Metaphysics.
4) But just as being is the first thing to fall within the unrestricted grasp
of the mind, so good is the first.thing to fall within the grasp of practical
reason - that is, reason directed to a work - for every active principle acts
on account-of an end, and end includes the intelligibility of good.
5) It follows that the first principle of practical reason is one founded on
the intelligibility of good - that is: Good is what each thing tends toward.
Therefore this is the primary precept of law: Good is to be done and pursued, 'and evil is to be avoided. All other precepts of the law of nature are
based on this one, in this way that under precepts of the law of nature come
all those things-to-be-done or things-to-be-avoided which practical reason
naturally grasps as human goods or their opposites.
6) Because good has the intelligibility of end, and evil has the intelligibility
of contrary to end, it follows that reason naturally grasps as goods - in consequence, as things-to-be-pursued by work, and their opposites as evils and
6 PATrOLOGIA LA'rINA vol. 64, col. 1311 (ed. J. Migne, Paris, 1844-1865).
T
METAPHYSiCA bk. iii, 1005b29.
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things-to-be-avoided- all the objects of man's natural inclinations. Hence
the order of the precepts of the law of nature is according to the order of
the natural inclinations.
7) First, there is in man an inclination based on the aspect of his nature
which he has in common with all substances- that is, that everything tends
according to its own nature to preserve its own being. In accordance with
this inclination, those things by which human life is preserved and by which
threats to life are met fall under natural law. Second, there is in man an
inclination to certain more restricted goods based on the aspect of his nature
which he has in common with other animals. In accordance with this inclination, those things are said to be of natural law "which nature teaches
all animals," among which are the union of male and female, the raising
of children, and the like. Third, there is in man an inclination to the good
based on the rational aspect of his nature, which is peculiar to himself. For
example, man has a natural inclination to this, that he might know the truth
concerning God, and to this, that he might live in society. In accordance
with this inclination, those things relating to an inclination of this sort fall
under natural law. For instance, that man should avoid ignorance, that he
should not offend those among whom he must live, and other points relevant
to this inclination. 8
Aquinas's solution to the question is that there are many precepts of the
natural law, but that this multitude is not a disorganized aggregation but an
orderly whole. The precepts are many because the different inclinations' objects,
viewed by reason as ends for rationally guided efforts, lead to distinct norms of
action. The natural law, nevertheless, is one because each object of inclination
obtains its role in practical reason's legislation only insofar as it is subject to
practical reason's way of determining action- by prescribing how ends are to
be attained. 9
Now we must examine this response more carefully.
In the first paragraph Aquinas restates the analogy between precepts of natural
law and first principles of theoretical reason. The latter are principles of demon8 S.T. 1-2, q. 94, a. 2, c. The translation is my own; the paragraphing is added. The
two fullest commentaries on this article that I have found are J. B. Schuster, S.J., Von
den ethischen Prinzipien: Eine Thomasstudie zu S. Th., I-II, q. 94, a. 2, 57 ZFrrSCHRIFT
and MICHAEL V. MURRAY, S.J., PROBLEMS
FUR KATHOLISCHE THEOLOGIE 44-65 (1933)
IN ETHICS 220-235 (New York, 1960). See also Van Overbeke, op. cit. supra note 3, at
450-58; Gregory Stevens, O.S.B., The Relations of Law and Obligation, 29 PROCEEINGS OF
Many useful
THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION 195-205 (1955).
points have been derived from each of these sources for the interpretation developed below.
9 After giving this response to the issue, Aquinas answers briefly each of the three introductory arguments. All of them tended to show that natural law has but one precept. To
the first argument, based on the premises that law itself is a precept and that natural law
is one, Aquinas answers that the many precepts of the natural law are unified in relation to
the primary principle. To the second argument, that man's lower nature must be represented
if the precepts of the law of nature are diversified by the parts of human nature, Aquinas
unhesitatingly answers that all parts of human nature are represented in natural law, for
the inclination of each part of man belongs to natural law insofar as it falls under a precept
of reason; in this respect all the inclinations also fall under the one first principle. To
the third argument, that law belongs to reason and that reason is one, Aquinas responds
that reason indeed is one in itself, and yet that natural law contains many precepts because
reason directs everything which concerns man, who is complex. Each of these three answers
merely reiterates the response to the main question.
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stration in systematic sciences such as geometry. From the outset, Aquinas speaks
of "precepts" in the plural. The first paragraph implies that only self-evident
principles of practical reason belong to natural law; Aquinas is using "natural
law" here in its least extensive sense. 10 It is clear already at this point that
Aquinas counts many self-evident principles among the precepts of the law of
nature, and that there is a mistake in any interpretation of his theory which
reduces all but one of the precepts to the status of conclusions. 1 1
In the second paragraph of the response Aquinas clarifies the meaning of
"self-evident." His purpose is not to postulate a peculiar meaning for "selfevident" in terms of which the basic precepts of natural law might be self-evident
although no one in fact knew them.1 2 That Aquinas did not have this in mind
appears at the beginning of the third paragraph, where he begins to determine
the priorities among those things "which fall within the grasp of everyone."
No doubt there are some precepts not everyone knows although they are objectively self-evident- for instance, precepts concerning the relation of man to
God: God should be loved above all, and: God should be obeyed before all.
Man can be ignorant of these precepts because God does not fall within our
grasp so that the grounds of his lovability and authority are evident to everybody.13 Howeier, basic principles of natural law on the whole, and particularly
the precepts mentioned in this response, are self-evident to all men.
10 In other texts he considers conclusions drawn from these principles also to be precepts
of natural law - e.g., S.T. 1-2, q. 94, a. 4, ad 1. This point is merely lexicographical,
yet it has caused some confusion - for instance, concerning the relationship between
natural law and the law of nations, for sometimes Aquinas contradistinguishes the two
while sometimes he includes the law of.nations in natural law. See LOTTIN, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 61-73.
1 A careful reading of this paragraph also excludes another interpretation of Aquinas's
theory of natural law -that

proposed by Jacques Maritain.

MAN AND THE STATE 84-94

(Chicago, 1951), is the most complete expression in English of Maritain's recent view.
His position has undergone some development in its various presentations. Maritain suggests that natural law does not itself fall within the category of knowledge; he tries to give it
a status independent of knowledge so that it can be the object of gradual discovery. He
also claims that man's knowledge of natural law is not conceptual and rational, but instead
is by inclination, connaturality, or congeniality. However, Aquinas does not present natural
law as if it were an object known or to be known; rather, he considers the precepts of
practical reason themselves to be natural law. Thus the principles of the law of nature
cannot be potential objects of knowledge, unknown but waiting in hiding, fully formed
and ready for discovery. Moreover, the fact that the precepts of natural law are viewed
as self-evident principles of practical reason excludes Maritain's account of our knowledge
of them. For Aquinas, there is no nonconceptual intellectual knowledge: DE vERrrATE,
q. 4, a. 2, ad 5. How misleading Maritain's account of the knowledge of natural law is, so
far as Aquinas's position is concerned, can be seen by examining some studies based on
Maritain: Kai Nielsen, An Examination of the Thomistic Theory of Natural Moral Law,
4 NATURAL LAw FORUM 47-50 (1959); PAUL RAMSEY, NINE MODERN MORALISTS 215223 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1962). Nielsen was not aware, as Ramsey was, that Maritain's theory of knowledge of natural law should not be ascribed to Aquinas.
12Nielsen, op. cit. supra note 11, at 50-52, apparently misled by Maritain, follows this
interpretation. At any rate Nielsen's implicit supposition that the naural law for Aquinas
must be formally identical with the eternal law is in conflict with Aquinas's notion of
participation according to which the participation is never formally identical with that in
which it participates.
23Thus Aquinas remarks (S. T. 1-2, q. 100, a. 3, ad 1) that the precept of charity is
"self-evident to human reason, either by nature or by faith," since a knowledge of God
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Why, then, has Aquinas introduced the distinction between objective self-.
evidence and self-evidence to us? I think he does so simply to clarify the meaning of "self-evident," for he wishes to deal with practical principles that are
self-evident in the latter, and fuller, of the two possible senses.
Self-evidence in, fact has two aspects. On the one hand, a principle is not
self-evident if it can be derived from some prior principle, which provides a
foundation for it. On the other hand, a principle is not useful as a starting point
of inquiry and as a limit of proof unless its underivability is known. The objective aspect of self-evidence, underivability, depends upon the lack of a middle
term which might connect the subject and predicate of the principle and supply
the cause of its truth. In other words, the reason for the truth of the self-evident
principle is what is directly signified by it, not any extrinsic cause. The subjective aspect of self-evidence, recognition of underivability, requires that one have
such an adequate understanding of what is signified by the principle that no
mistaken effort will be made to provide a derivation for it.
Aquinas expresses the objective aspect of self-evidence by saying that the
predicate of a self-evident principle belongs to the intelligibility of the subject,
and he expresses the subjective aspect of self-evidence in the requirement that
this intelligibility not be unknown. These remarks may have misleading connotations for us, for we have been conditioned by several centuries of philosophy
in which analytic truths (truths of reason) are opposed to synthetic truths (truths
of fact). Only truths of reason are supposed to be necessary, but their necessity
is attributed to meaning which is thought of as a quality inherent in ideas in
the mind. Only truths of fact are supposed to have any reference to real things,
but all truths of fact are thought to be contingent, because it is assumed that
all necessity is rational in character. Thus the modern reader is likely to wonder:
"Are Aquinas's self-evident principles analytic or synthetic?" Of course, there
is no answer to this question in Aquinas's terms. He does not accept the dichotomy between mind and material reality that is implicit in the analytic-synthetic
distinction. Nor does he merely insert another bin between the two, as Kant
did when he invented the synthetic a priori. Rather, Aquinas proceeds on the
supposition that meanings derive from things known and that experienced things
themselves contain a certain degree of intelligible necessity.14
Thus, "the predicate belongs to the intelligibility of the subject" does not
mean that one element of a complex meaning is to be found among others
within the complex. But does not Aquinas imagine the subject as if it were a
container full of units of meaning, each unit a predicate? No, he thinks of
the subject and the predicate as complementary aspects of a unified knowledge
of a single objective dimension of the reality known. An object of consideration
ordinarily belongs to the world of experience and all the aspects of our knowledge of 'that object are grounded in that experience. For example, both subject
and predicate of the proposition, Rust is an oxide, are based on experience. We
sufficient to form the natural law precept of charity can come from either natural knowledge or divine revelation.
14A useful guide to Aquinas's theory of principles is PETER HOENEN, S.J., REALITY AND
JUDGMENT ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS

(Chicago, 1952).
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do not discover the truth of the principle by analyzing the meaning of "rust";
rather we discover that oxide belongs to the intelligibility of rust by coming to
see that this proposition is a self-evident (underivable) truth.
But in this discussion I have been using the word "intelligibility" (ratio)
which Aquinas uses both in this paragraph and later in the response. Here he
says that in a self-evident principle the predicate belongs to the intelligibility
of the subject; later he says that good belongs to the intelligibility of end and
that end belongs to the intelligibility of good. I have just said that oxide belongs
to the intelligibility of rust. Now what is an intelligibility?
It is not merely the meaning with which a word is used, for someone may
use a word, such as "rust," and use it correctly, without understanding all that
is included in its intelligibility. On the other hand, the intelligibility does not
include all that belongs to things denoted by the word, since it belongs to one
bit of rust to be on my car's left rear fender, but this is not included in the
intelligibility of rust. One might translate ratio as "essence"; yet every word
expresses some intelligibility, while not every word signifies essence. Thus "good"
does not signify an essence, much less does "nonbeing," but both express intelligibilities.15
An intelligibility is all that would be included in the meaning of a word
that is used cdrrectly if the things referred to in that use were fully known in
all ways relevant to the aspect then signified by the word in question. Thus
the intelligibility includes the meaning with which a word is used, but it also
includes whatever increment of meaning the same word would have in the
same use if what is denoted by the word were more perfectly known. An intelligibility need not correspond to any part or principle of the object of knowledge, yet an intelligibility is an aspect of the partly known and still further
knowable object. We may imagine an intelligibility as an intellect-sized bite
of reality, a bite not necessarily completely digested by the mind. An intelligibility includes the meaning and potential meaning of a word uttered by intelligence about a world whose reality, although naturally suited to our minds, is
not in itself cut into pieces - intelligibilities. These we distinguish and join in
the processes of analysis and synthesis which constitute our rational knowing.
Hence part of an intelligibility may escape us without our missing all of it.
The child who knows that rust is on metal has grasped one self-evident truth
about rust, for metal does belong to the intelligibility of rust. The same child
may not know" that rust is an oxide, although oxide also belongs to the intelligibility of rust.
The important point to grasp from all this is that when Aquinas speaks of
self-evident principles of natural law, he does not mean tautologies derived by
mere conceptual analysis -for
example: Stealing is wrong, where "stealing"
means the unjust taking of another's property. Rather, he means the principles
of practical inquiry which also are the limits of practical argument -a
set of
underivable principles for practical reason. To function as principles, their
status as underivables must be recognized, and this recognition depends upon
15

On "ratio"

see ANDRE HAYEN,

S.J.,

(2nd ed., Bruges, Bruxelles, Paris, 1954).
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a sufficient understanding of their terms, i.e., of the intelligibilities signified by
those terms.
In the third paragraph Aquinas begins to apply the analogy between the
precepts of the natural law and the first principles of demonstrations. Being
is the basic intelligibility; it represents our first discovery about anything we are
to know - that it is something to be known. The first principle, expressed here
in the formula, "To affirm and simultaneously to deny is excluded," is the one
sometimes called "the principle of contradiction" and sometimes called "the
principle of noncontradiction": The same cannot both be and not be at the
same time and in the same respect. In this more familiar formulation it is
clearer that the principle is based upon being and nonbeing, for it is obvious
that what the principle excludes is the identification of being with nonbeing.
The objective dimension of the reality of beings that we know in knowing this
principle is simply the definiteness that is involved in their very objectivity, a
definiteness that makes a demand on the intellect knowing them, the very
think consistently of them. 1 6
least demand -to
To say that all other principles are based on this principle does not mean
that all other principles are derived from it by deduction. In fact the principle
of contradiction does not directly enter into arguments as a premise except in
the case of arguments ad absurdum.1 7 Rather, this principle is basic in that it
is given to us by our most primitive understanding. All other knowledge of anything adds to this elementary appreciation of the definiteness involved in its
very objectivity, for any further knowledge is a step toward giving some intelligible
character to this definiteness, i.e., toward defining things and knowing them in
their wholeness and their concrete interrelations. But the first principle all
the while exercises its unobtrusive control, for it drives the mind on toward
judgment, never permitting it to settle into inconsistent muddle.
In the fourth paragraph Aquinas states that good is the primary intelligibility
to fall under practical reason, and he explains why this is so. On the analogy
he is developing, he clearly means that nothing can be understood by practical
reason without the intelligibility of good being included in it.
Now what is practical reason? Is it simply knowledge sought for practical
purposes? No, Aquinas considers practical reason to be the mind playing a
certain role, or functioning in a certain capacity, the capacity in which it is
"directed to a work." Direction to work is intrinsic to the mind in this capacity;
direction qualifies the very functioning of the mind. Practical reason is the mind
working as a principle of action, not simply as a recipient of objective reality.
It is the mind charting what is to be, not merely recording what already is.
It is easy to imagine that to know is to picture an object in one's mind, but
this conception of knowledge is false. Even for purely theoretical knowledge, to
know is a fulfillment reached by a development through which one comes to
share in a spiritual way the characteristics and reality of the world which is
16

IN LIBROS METAPHYSICORUM ARISTOTELIS lib. 4, lect. 6.

17 IN LIBROS POSTERIORUM ANALYTICORUM AiuSTOTELIS lib. 1, lect. 20.
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known. Knowledge is a unity between man knowing and what he knows. In
the case of theoretical knowledge, the known has the reality which is shared
before the knower comes to share in it-in
theory the mind must conform to
facts and the world calls the turn. In practical knowledge, on the other hand,
the knower arrives at the destination first; and what is known will be altered
as a result of having been thought about, since the known must conform to the
mind of the knower. The mind uses the power of the knower to see that the
known will conform to it; the mind calls the turn.
Yet it would be a mistake to suppose that practical knowledge, because it
is prior to its object, is independent of experience. Even in theoretical knowledge,
actual understanding and truth are not discovered in experience and extracted
from it by a simple process of separation. Experience can be understood and
truth can be known about the things of experience, but understanding and
truth attain a dimension of reality that is not actually contained within experience,
although experience touches the surface of the same reality. In theoretical
knowledge, the dimension of reality that is attained by understanding and
truth is realized already in the object of thought, apart from our thought of it.
Our minds use the data of experience as a bridge to cross into reality in order
to grasp the more-than-given truth of things.
Practical kfiowledge also depends on experience, and of course the intelligibility of good and the truth attained by practical knowledge are not given in
experience. But the practical mind is unlike the theoretical mind in this way,
that the intelligibility and truth of practical knowledge do not attain a dimension of reality already lying beyond the data of experience ready to be grasped
through them. No, practical knowledge refers to a quite different dimension
of reality, one which is indeed a possibility through the given, but a possibility
which must be realized, if it is to be actual at all, through the mind's own direction. The theoretical mind crosses the bridge of the given to raid the realm of
being; there the mind can grasp everything, actual or possible, whose reality
is not conditioned upon the thought and action of man. The practical mind
also crosses the bridge of the given, but it bears gifts into the realm of being,
for practical knowledge contributes that whose possibility, being opportunity,
requires human action for its realization.
When I think that there should .be more work done on the foundations of
specific theories of natural law, such a judgment is practical knowledge, for the
mind requires *thatthe situation it is considering change to fit its demands rather
than the other way about. Practical reason does not have its truth by conforming to what it knows, for what practical reason knows does not have the being
and the definiteness it would need to be a standard for intelligence. Only after
practical reason thinks does the object of its thought begin to be a reality.
Practical reason has its truth by anticipating the point at which something that
is possible through human action will come into conformity with reason, and
by directing effort toward that point.' 8
18S. T. 1, q. 79, a. 11; 1-2, q. 57, aa. 4-5; 3, q. 78, a. 5, c.; IN LIUROS ETHICORUM
ARISTOTELIS lib. 1, lect. 1.

See JOHN E. NAUS,

INTELLECT ACCORDING TO SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

S.J., THE NATURE OF THE PRACTICAL
(Roma, 1959).
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Now if practical reason is the mind functioning as a principle of action,
it is subject to all the conditions necessary for every active principle. One of
these is that every active principle acts on account of an end. An active principle
is going to bring about something or other, or else it would not be an active
principle at all. It is necessary for the active principle to be oriented toward
that something or other, whatever it is, if it is going to be brought about. This
orientation means that at the very beginning an action must have definite direction and that it must imply a definite limit.19
There are two ways of misunderstanding this principle that make nonsense
of it. One is to suppose that it means anthropomorphism, a view at home both
in the primitive, mind and in idealistic metaphysics. If every active principle
acts on account of an end, so the anthropomorphic argument goes, then it must
act for the sake of a goal, just as men do when they act with a purpose in view.
But the generalization is illicit, for acting with a purpose in view is only one
way, the specifically human way, in which an active principle can have the
orientation it needs in order to begin to act. The other misunderstanding is
common to mathematically minded rationalists, who project the timelessness
and changelessness of formal system onto reality, and to empiricists, who react
to rationalism without criticizing its fundamental assumptions. The rationalist,
convinced that reality is unchangeable, imagines that the orientation present
in an active principle must not refer to real change, and so he reduces this
necessary condition of change to the status of something which stably is at a
static moment in time. What is at a single moment, the rationalist thinks, is
stopped in its flight, so he tries to treat every relationship of existing beings to
their futures as comparisons of one state of affairs to another. It is the rationalistic
assumptions in the back of his mind that make the empiricist try to reduce dispositional properties to predictions about future states.
Let us imagine a teaspoonful of sugar held over a cup of hot coffee. It
is nonsense to claim that the solubility of the sugar merely means that it will
dissolve. Solubility is true of the sugar now, and yet this property is unlike those
which characterize the sugar as to what it actually is already, for solubility characterizes it with reference to a process in which it is suited to be involved. The
orientation of an active principle toward an end is like that- it is a real aspect
of dynamic reality. In the case of practical reason, acting on account of an end
is acting for the sake of a goal, for practical reason is an active principle that is
conscious and self-determining. Purpose in view, then, is a real aspect of the
dynamic reality of practical reason, and a necessary condition of reason's being
practical.
But must every end involve good? In some senses of the word "good" it
need not. Not all outcomes are ones we want or enjoy. But if "good" means
that toward which each thing tends by its own intrinsic principle of orientation,
then for each active principle the end on account of which it acts also is a good
for it, since nothing can act with definite orientation except on account of something toward which, for its part, it tends. And, in fact, tendency toward is more
basic than action on account of, for every active principle tends toward what its
19S. T. 1-2, q. 1, a. 2;
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action will bring about, but not every tending ability goes into action on account
of the object of its tendency.
Practical reason, therefore, presupposes good. In its role as active principle
the mind must think in terms of what can be an object of tendency. In other
terms the mind can think, but then it will not set out to cause what it thinks.
If the mind is to work toward unity with what it knows by conforming the
known to itself rather than by conforming itself to the known, then the mind
must think the known under the intelligibility of the good, for it is only as an
object of tendency and as a possible object of action that what is to be through
practical reason has any reality at all. Thus it is that good first falls within
the grasp of practical reason just as being first falls within the unrestricted grasp
of the mind.
In the fifth paragraph Aquinas enunciates the first principle of practical
reason and indicates the way in which other evident precepts of the law of
nature are founded on it.
He points out, to begin with, that the first principle of practical reason
must be based on the intelligibility of good, by analogy with the primary theoretical principle which is based on the intelligibility of being. The intelligibility
of good is: what each thing tends toward. This formula is a classic expression
of what the word "good" means. 20 Of course, we often mean more than this
by "good," but any other meaning at least includes this notion. "Good is what
each thing tends toward" is not the formula of the first principle of practical
reason, then, but merely a formula expressing the intelligibility of good. 2 ' "First
principle of practical reason" and "first precept of the law" here are practically
synonyms; their denotation is the same, but the former connotes derived practical
knowledge while the latter connotes rationally guided action.
Until the object of practical reason is realized, it exists only in reason and
in the action toward it that reason directs. Now since any object of practical
reason first must be understood as an object of tendency, practical reason's first
step in effecting conformity with itself is to direct the doing of works in pursuit
of an end. Just as the principle of contradiction expresses the definiteness which
is the first condition of the objectivity of things and the consistency which is
the first condition of theoretical reason's conformity to reality, so the first principle of practical reason expresses the imposition of tendency, which is the first
condition of riason's objectification of itself, and directedness or intentionality,
bk. I, 1094b3.
D. O'Donoghue, The Thomist Conception of Natural Law, 22
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101 (also, p. 107, n. 3) (1955), holds that Aquinas means that "Good is
what all things tend toward" is the first principle of practical reason, and so Fr. O'Donoghue
wishes to distinguish this from the first precept of natural law. However, Aquinas actually
says: "Et ideo primum principium in ratione practica est quod fundatur supra rationem
boni, quae est, Bonum est quod omnia appetunt." S. T., 1-2, q. 94, a. 2, c. Fr. O'Donoghue
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the next line of text, while the ratio boni is not a principle of practical reason but a quasi
definition of "good," and as such a principle of understanding. The principle of contradiction is likewise founded on the ratio of being, but no formula of this ratio is given here.
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which is the first condition for conformity to mind on the part of works and
ends. A sign that intentionality or directedness is the first condition for conformity
to practical reason is the expression of imputation: "He acted on purpose, intentionally."
In forming this first precept practical reason performs its most basic task,
for it simply determines that whatever it shall think about must at least be set
it must be if reason is to be able to think of it
on the way to something -as
practically. Any other precept will add to this first one; other precepts determine
precisely what the direction is and what the starting point must be if that direction
is to be followed out. The first principle of practical reason thus gives us a way
of interpreting experience; it provides an outlook in terms of which subsequent
precepts will be formed, for it lays down the requirement that every precept must
prescribe, just as the first principle of theoretical reason is an awareness that
every assent posits. Awareness of the principle of contradiction demands consistency henceforth; one must posit in assenting, and thought cannot avoid the
position assenting puts it in. Similarly, the establishment of the first precept of
practical reason determines that there shall be direction henceforth. In prescribing we must direct, and we cannot reasonably avoid carrying out in reality
the intelligibility which reason has conceived.
Practical reason, equipped with the primary principle it has formed, does
not spin the whole of natural law out of itself. It is true that if "natural law"
refers to all the general practical judgments reason can form, much of natural
law can be derived by reasoning. But reason needs starting points. And it is
with these starting points that Aquinas is concerned at the end of the fifth
paragraph. The primary precepts of practical reason, he says, concern the
things-to-be-done that practical reason naturally grasps as human goods, and the
things-to-be-avoided that are opposed to those goods.
Of course, we can be conditioned to enjoy perverse forms of indulgence,
but we could not be conditioned if we did not have, not only at the beginning
but also as an underlying constant throughout the entire learning process, an
inclination toward pleasure. We can be taught the joys of geometry, but that
would be impossible if we did not have natural curiosity that makes us appreciate
the point of asking a question and getting an answer. Our personalities are
largely shaped by acculturation in our particular society, but society would never
affect us if we had no basic aptitude for living with others. The infant learns
to feel guilty when mother frowns, because he wants to please.
Practical reason's task is to direct its object toward the point at which it
will attain the fullness of realization that is conceived by the mind before it is
delivered into the world. But in directing its object, practical reason presides
over a development, and so it must use available material. Hence the basic
precepts of practical reason accept the possibilities suggested by experience and
direct the objects of reason's consideration toward the fulfillments taking shape
in the mind.
In the sixth paragraph Aquinas explains how practical reason forms the
basic principles of its direction. The primary precept provides a point of view
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from which experience is considered. Within experience we have tendencies
which make themselves felt; they point their way toward appropriate objects.
These inclinations are part of ourselves, and so their objects are human goods.
Before intelligence enters, man acts by sense spontaneity and learns by sense
experience. Thus in experience we have a basis upon which reason can form
patterns of action that will further or frustrate the inclinations we feel.
We can reflect upon and interpret our experience in a purely theoretical
frame of mind. In that case we simply observe that we have certain tendencies
that are more or less satisfied by what we do. However, when the question
concerns what we shall do, the first principle of practical reason assumes control
and immediately puts us in a nontheoretical frame of mind. This principle
provides us with an instrument for making another kind of sense of our experience. The object of a tendency becomes an objective which is to be imposed
by the mind as we try to make the best of what faces us by bringing it into conformity with practical truth. Practical reason is mind directed to direct and it
directs as it can. But it can direct only toward that for which man can be
brought to act, and that is either toward the objects of his natural inclinations
or toward objectives that derive from these. If practical reason ignored what
is given in experience, it would have no power to direct, for what-is-to-be cannot
come from nothing. The direction of practical reason presupposes possibilities
on which reason can get leverage, and such possibilities arise only in reflection
upon experience. The leverage reason gets on these possibilities is expressed
in the basic substantive principles of natural law.
At the beginning of paragraph six Aquinas seems to have come full circle,
for the opening phrase here, "good has the intelligibility of end," simply reverses
the last phrase of paragraph four: "end includes the intelligibility of good."
There is a circle here, but it is not vicious; Aquinas is clarifying, not demonstrating. In the fourth paragraph he is pointing out that the need for practical
reason, as an active principle, to think in terms of end implies that its first grasp
on its objects will be of them as good, since any objective of action must first
be an object of tendency. Now in the sixth paragraph he is indicating the basis
on which reason primarily prescribes as our natural inclinations suggest. Is
reason merely an instrument in the service of nature, accepting what nature
indicates as good by moving us toward it? No, the derivation is not direct, and
the position of reason in relation to inclination is not merely passive. Using the
primary principle, reason reflects on experience in which the natural inclinations
are found pointing to goods appropriate to themselves. But why does reason
take these goods as its own? Not because they are given, but because reason's
good, which is intelligible, contains the aspect of end, and the goods to which
the inclinations point are prospective ends. Reason prescribes according to the
order of natural inclinations because reason directs to possible actions, and the
possible patterns of human action are determined by the natural inclinations,
for man cannot act on account of that toward which he has no basis for affinity
in his inclinations.
The seventh and last paragraph of Aquinas's response is very rich and interest-
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ing, but the details of its content are outside the scope of this paper. Here
Aquinas indicates how the complexity of human nature gives rise to a multiplicity
of inclinations, and these to a multiplicity of precepts. It is noteworthy that in
each of the three ranks he distinguishes among an aspect of nature, the inclination based upon it, and the precepts that are in accordance with it. Nature is
not natural law; nature is the given from which man develops and from which
arise tendencies of ranks corresponding to its distinct strata. These tendencies
are not natural law; the tendencies indicate possible actions, and hence they
provide reason with the point of departure it requires in order to propose ends.
The precepts of reason which clothe the objects of inclinations in the intelligibility
of ends-to-be-pursued-by-work - these precepts are the natural law. Thus natural
law has many precepts which are unified in this, that all of these precepts are
ordered to practical reason's achievement of its own end, the direction of action
toward end.
II

There is one obvious difference between the two formulae, "Do good and
avoid evil," and "Good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided."
That difference is the omission of pursuit from the one, the inclusion of it in the
other. The mistaken interpretation of Aquinas's theory of natural law overlooks
the place of final causality in his position and restricts the meaning of "good" and
"evil" in the first principle to the quality of moral actions. In this section I wish
to clarify this point, and the lack of "prosequendum" in the non-Thomistic
formula is directly relevant.
We have seen how important the conception of end, or final causality, is to
Aquinas's understanding of natural law. Practical reason understands its objects
in terms of good because, as an active principle, it necessarily acts on account
of an end. Practical reason prescribes precisely in view of ends. The first precept
is that all subsequent direction must be in terms of intelligible goods, i.e., ends
toward which reason can direct.
Nevertheless, a theory of natural law, such as. I sketched at the beginning
of this paper, which omits even to mention final causality, sometimes has been
attributed to Aquinas. Thus to insure this fundamental point, it will be useful
to examine the rest of the treatise on law in which the present issue arises.
In defining law, Aquinas first asks whether law is something belonging to
reason. His response, justly famous for showing that his approach to law is
intellectualistic rather than voluntaristic, may be summarized as follows. The
end is the first principle in matters of action; reason orders to the end; therefore, reason is the principle of action. The principle in action is the rule of
action; therefore, reason is the rule of action. The rule of action binds; therefore, reason binds. But binding is characteristic of law; therefore, law pertains
to reason. 22 From this argument we see that the notion of end is fundamental
to Aquinas's conception of law, and the priority of end among principles of
action is the most basic reason why law belongs to reason.
In the next article, Aquinas adds another element to his definition by asking
22
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whether law always is ordained to the common good. His response is that law,
as a rule and measure of human acts, belongs to their principle, reason. But
in reason itself there is a basic principle, and the first principle of practical reason is the ultimate end. Since the ultimate end is a common good, law must
be ordained to the common good. 23 What is noteworthy here is Aquinas's
assumption that the first principle of practical reason is the last end. The good
of which practical reason prescribes the pursuit and performance, then, primarily
is the last end, for practical reason cannot direct the possible actions which are
its 6bjects without directing them to an end.
Thus we see that final causality underlies Aquinas's conception of what law
is. But it is central throughout the whole treatise. In the treatise on the Old
Law, for example, Aquinas takes up the question whether this law contains only
a single precept. His response is that since precepts oblige, they are concerned
with duties, and duties derive from the requirements of an end. Hence it belongs
to the very intelligibility of precept that it direct to an end. Since the Old
Law directs to a single end, it is one in this respect; but since many things are
necessary or useful to this end, precepts are multiplied by the distinction of
matters that require direction. 24 Again, what is to be noticed in this response
is that Aquinas's whole understanding of law clearly depends on final causality.
Obligation is a'strictly derivative concept, with its origin in ends and the requirements set by ends. 2 5 If natural law imposes obligations that good acts are to
be done, it is only because it primarily imposes with rational necessity that an
end must be pursued.
In his youthful commentary on Lombard's Books of Sentences, Aquinas goes
so far as to consider the principles of practical reason- which he already compares to the principles of demonstrations -to be so many innate natural ends. 26
He remarks that the habit of. these ends is synderesis, which is the habit of the
principles of the natural law. 27 Hence in this early work he is saying that the
natural law is precisely the ends to which man is naturally inclined insofar as
these ends are present in reason as principles for the rational direction of action.
Later in the same work Aquinas explicitly formulates the notion of the law
of nature for the first time in his writings. Why are the principles of practical
reason called "natural law"? Precisely because man knows the intelligibility
of end and the proportion of his work to end. Suitability of action is not to a
static nature, but to the ends toward which nature inclines. Evil is not explained
ultimately by 6pposition to law, but opposition to law by unsuitability of action
to end. This early treatment of natural law is saturated with the notion of end. 28
So far as I have been able to discover, Aquinas was the first to formulate the
primary precept of natural law as he did. Lottin informs us that already with
23 S.T. 1-2, q. 90, a. 2, c.
24
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Stephen of Tournai, around 1160, there is a definition of natural law as an
innate principle for doing good and avoiding evil. 2 9 While this is a definition
rather than a formulation of the first principle, it is still interesting to notice
that it does not include pursuit. In fact, several authors to whom Lottin refers
seem to think of natural law as a principle of choice; and if the good and evil
referred to in their definitions are properly objects of choice, then it is clear that
their understanding of natural law is limited to its bearing upon moral good and
evil - the value immanent in action - and that they simply have no idea of the
30
Wilrelevance of good as end - a principle of action that transcends action.
liam of Auxerre's position is particularly interesting. He not only omits any
mention of end, but he excludes experience from the formation of natural law,
so that the precepts of natural law seem to be for William pure intuitions of
31
right and wrong.
Thus it is clear that Aquinas emphasizes end as a principle of natural law.
But it is also clear that the end in question cannot be identified with moral
goodness itself.
To begin with, Aquinas specifically denies that the ultimate end of man
could consist in morally good action. Moral action, and that upon which it
immediately bears, can be directed to ulterior goods, and for this very reason
moral action cannot be the absolutely ultimate end.3 2 Moreover, Aquinas expressly identifies the principles of practical reason with the ends of the virtues
preexisting in reason. Prudence is concerned with moral actions which are in
33
fact means to ends, and prudence directs the work of all the moral virtues.
Hence the principles of natural law, in their expression of ends, transcend moral
good and evil as the end transcends means and obstacles.
This transcendence of the goodness of the end over the goodness of moral
action has its ultimate metaphysical foundation in this, that the end of each
creature's action can be an end for it only by being a participation in divine
goodness. The goodness of God is the absolutely ultimate final cause, just as the
power of God is the absolutely ultimate efficient cause.3 4 This end, of course,
does not depend for realization on human action, much less can it be identified
with human action. But moral good and evil are precisely the inner perfection
or privation of human action. Hence the end transcends morality and provides
an extrinsic foundation for it. This point is of the greatest importance in Aquinas's
treatise on the end of man. Aristotle identifies the end of man with virtuous
activity, 35 but Aquinas, despite his debt to Aristotle, sees the end of man as the
attainment of a good. The good in question is God, who altogether transcends
human activity. Hence an end for Aquinas has two inseparable aspects - what
is attained and the attainment of it. But if these must be distinguished, the end
is rather in what is attained than in its attainment.3 6
29
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Nor should it be supposed that the end's transcendence over moral virtue
is a peculiarity of the supernatural end. Natural law does not direct man to his
supernatural end; in fact, it is precisely because it is inadequate to do so that
divine law is needed as a supplement. 37 Or, to put the same thing in another
way, not everything contained in the Law and the Gospel pertains to natural
law, because many of these points concern matters supernatural.38 And yet,
as we have seen, the principles of natural law are given the status of ends of
the moral virtues.
*An attentive reading of the last two paragraphs of the response examined
above would be by itself sufficient for our present point. The goods in question
are objects of man's natural inclinations. These goods are not primarily works
that are to be done. Rather, the works are means to ulterior ends: reason grasps
the objects of the natural inclinations as goods and so as things-to-be-pursued
by work. The works obviously are means to the goods. And what are the
objects of the natural inclinations? Not merely morally good acts, but such substantive goods as self-preservation, the life and education of children, and knowledge.
Some interpreters mistakenly ask whether the word "good" in the first principle has a transcendental or an ethical sense. 39 The issue is a false one, for
there is no question of extending the meaning of "good" to the amplitude of
the transcendentals convertible with "being." The very text clearly indicates
that Aquinas is concerned with good as the object of practical reason; hence
the goods signified by the "good" of the first principle will be human goods. It
must be so, since the good pursued by practical reason is an objective of human
action. But to grant this point is not at all to identify the good in question with
moral value, for this particular category of value by no means exhausts human
goods. The preservation of human life is certainly a human good. The act
which preserves life is not the life preserved; in fact, they are so distinct that
it is possible for the act that preserves life to be morally bad while the life
preserved remains a human good.
The failure to keep this distinction in mind can lead to chaos in normative
ethics. But more important for our present purpose is that this distinction indicates that the good which is to be done and pursued should not be thought of
as exclusively the good of moral action. The pursuit of the good which is the
end is primary; the doing of the good which is the means is subordinate. The
good which is the end is the principle of moral value, and at least in some respects
this principle transcends its consequence, just as being in a certain respect is a
principle (of beings) that transcends even the most fundamental category of
beings.40
37 S. T. 1-2, q. 91, a. 4.
38
Id. at q. 94, a. 4, ad 1.
39 E.g., Schuster, op. cit. supra note 8, at 54-55.
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Although too long a task to be undertaken here, a full comparison of Aquinas's position to that of Suarez would help to clarify the present point. See WALTER FARRELL, O.P.,
THE NATURAL MORAL LAW ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS AND SUAREZ 103-155 (Ditchling,
1930). We at least can indicate a few significant passages. Suarez offers a number of
formulations of the first principle of the natural law. He manages to treat the issue of
the unity or multiplicity of precepts without actually stating the primary precept. DE
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Aquinas, of course, never takes a utilitarian view of the value of moral action.
But his alternative is not the deontologism that assigns to moral value and the
perfection of intention the status of absolutes. Utilitarianism is an inadequate
ethical theory partly because it overly restricts natural inclination, for it assumes
that man's sole determinate inclination is in regard to pleasure and pain. Aquinas
recognizes a variety of natural inclinations, including one to act in a rational
way. 4 1 Among the ends toward which the precepts of the natural law direct,
then, moral value has a place. Hence good human action has intrinsic worth,
not merely instrumental value as utilitarianism supposes. Moreover, because
the end proposed by the utilitarians is only a psychic state and because utilitarians
also hold a mechanistic theory of causality, utilitarianism denies that any kind
of action is intrinsically good or bad. Thus actions are considered good or bad
only by virtue of extrinsic consequences. Aquinas, on the contrary, understands
human action not merely as a piece of behavior but as an object of choice. He
considers a whole range of nonpsychic realities to be human goods. His theory
of causality does not preclude an intrinsic relationship between acts and ends.
Hence he holds that-some species of acts are bad in themselves, so that they
42
cannot become good under any circumstances.
In sum, the mistaken interpretation of Aquinas's theory of natural law supII, 8, 2. Previously, however, he had given the principle in the formulation:
"Good is to be done and evil avoided." Id. at II, 7, 2. But there and in a later passage,
where he actually mentions pursuit, he seems to be repeating received formulae. The
formula (Id. at II, 15, 2) referring to pursuit subordinates it to the avoidance of evil:
"Evil is to be avoided and good is to be pursued." Perhaps Suarez's most personal and
most characteristic formulation of the primary precept is given where he discusses the
scope of natural law. There his formulation of the principle is specifically moralistic:
The upright is to be done and the wrong avoided. (Id. at II, 7, 5: "Honestum est
faciendum, pravum vitandum.") Here too Suarez suggests that this principle is just one
among many first principles; he juxtaposes it with Do unto others as you would have
them do unto you. As to the end, Suarez completely separates the notion of it from the
notion of law. He considers the goodness and badness with which natural law is concerned
to be the moral value of acts in comparison with human nature, and he thinks of the natural
law itself as a divine precept that makes it possible for acts to have an additional value
of conformity with the law. Id. at II, 6. In neither aspect is the end fundamental. For
this reason, too, the natural inclinations are not emphasized by Suarez as they are by
Aquinas. Although Suarez mentions the inclinations, he does so while referring to Aquinas.
Id. at II, 5, 1-2. Before the end of the very same passage Suarez reveals what he really
thinks to be the foundation of the precepts of natural law. It is not the inclinations but
the quality of actions, a quality grounded on their own "intrinsic character and immutable
essence, which in no way depend upon any extrinsic cause or will, any more than does
the essence of other things which in themselves involve no contradiction." (We see at
the beginning of paragraph 5 that Suarez accepts this position as to its doctrine of "the
intrinsic goodness or turpitude of actions," and so as an account of the foundation of the
natural law precepts, although he does not accept it as an account of natural law, which
he considers to require an act of the divine will.) Later Suarez interprets the place of
the inclinations in Aquinas's theory. As Suarez sees it, the inclinations are not principles
in accordance with which reason forms the principles of natural law; they are only the
matter with which the natural law is concerned. Id. at II, 8, 4. In other words, in Suarez's
mind Aquinas only meant to say of the inclinations that they are subject to natural law.
This interpretation simply ignores the important role we have seen Aquinas assign the
inclinations in the formation of natural law.
41 S. T. 1-2, q. 94, a. 3, c.
42 Id. at q. 18, aa. 6-7; SuPER LiaRos SENTENTIARUM PETa LoMBARDI bk. 2, d. 40, q. 1,
aa. 1-2.
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poses that the word "good" in the primary precept refers solely to moral good.
In fact, it refers primarily to the end which is not limited to moral value. The
mistaken interpretation inevitably falls into circularity; Aquinas's real position
shows where moral reasoning can begin, for it works from transmoral principles
of moral action. The mistaken interpretation offers as a principle: Do good.
It subsumes actions under this imperative, which limits the meaning of "good"
to the good of action. Aquinas suggests as a principle: Work in pursuit of the
end. This principle enables the good that is an end not only to illuminate but
also to enrich with value the action by which it is attained.
III
The mistaken interpretation of Aquinas's theory suggests that law is essentially a curb upon action. Law is imagined as a command set over against even
those actions performed in obedience to it. And of course it is much more
opposed to wrong actions. In this section, I propose three respects in which
the primary principle of practical reason as Aquinas understands it is broader
in scope than this false interpretation suggests. A clearer understanding of the
scope of natural law will further unfold the implications of the point treated
in the last section; at the same time, it will be a basis for the fourth section.
The mistaken interpretation suggests that natural law is a set of imperatives
whose form leaves no room to discriminate among degrees of force to be attached
to various precepts. All precepts seem equally absolute; violation of any one
of them is equally a violation of the law.
For Aquinas, however, natural law includes counsels as well as precepts. In
other words, the first principle refers not only to the good which must be done,
but also to the nonobligatory good it would be well to do.
In the article next after the one commented upon above, Aquinas asks whether
the acts of all the virtues are of the law of nature. In his response he does not
exclude virtuous acts which are beyond the call of duty. He does make a distinction: all virtuous acts as such belong to the law of nature, but particular
virtuous acts may not, for they may depend upon human inquiry. 43
Later, in treating the Old Law, Aquinas maintains that all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law of nature, and then he proceeds to
distinguish those moral precepts which carry the obligation of strict precept
from those which convey only the warning of counsel. 44 Indeed, in treating
natural law in his commentary on the Sentences, Aquinas carefully distinguishes
between actions fully prohibited because they totally obstruct the attainment of
an end and actions restricted because they are obstacles to its attainment. Lottin
notices this point. Today, he says, we restrict the notion of law to strict obligations. But Aquinas took a broader view of it, for he understood law as a
principle of order which embraces the whole range of objects to which man
has a natural inclination. Consequently, when Aquinas wishes to indicate strict
,6 S.T. 1-2, q. 94, a. 3, c.
4 Id. at q. 100, aa. 1-2.
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obligation he often uses a special mode of expression to make this idea explicit.
Suarez refers to the passages where Aquinas discusses the scope of the natural
law. Although aware that Aquinas includes counsels as well as precepts in
natural law, Suarez prefers to limit his concern to matters of strict obligation:
"But We properly inquire concerning precepts." 46 It never occurs to Suarez to
wonder why he himself narrows the scope Aquinas attributed to law.
The difference between the two points of view is no mystery. Aquinas thinks
in terms of the end, and obligation is merely one result of the influence of an
intelligible end on reasonable -action. "Good" in the first principle, since it refers
primarily to the end, includes within its scope not only what is absolutely necessary but also what is helpful, and the opposed evil includes more than the perfect
contrary of the good. Like most later interpreters, Suarez thinks that what is
morally good or bad depends simply upon the agreement or disagreement of
action with nature, and he holds that the obligation to do the one and to avoid
the other arises from an imposition of the will of God.4 7 Hence "evil" in the
first principle of natural law denotes only the actions which definitely disagree
with nature, the doing of which is forbidden, and "good" denotes only the actions
whose omission definitely disagrees with nature, the doing of which is commanded.
An act which falls in neither of these categories is simply of no interest to a
legalistic moralist who does not see that moral value and obligation have their,
source in the end.
Perhaps even more surprising is another respect in which the first practical
principle as Aquinas sees it has a broader scope than is usually realized. "Every
judgment of practical reason proceeds from naturally known principles." 4 8 The
derivative is from the underived, the underivable principles. In practical reason
it is self-evident precepts that are underivable, natural law. Not only virtuous
and self-restrained men, but also vicious men and backsliders make practical
judgments. Indeed, if evildoers lacked practical judgment they could not engage
in human action at all. 4 9 It follows that practical judgments made in evil action
nevertheless fall under the scope of the first principle of the natural law, and
the word "good" in this principle must refer somehow to deceptive and inadequate
human goods as well as to adequate and genuine ones.
It is important, however, to see the precise manner in which the principle,
Good is to be done and pursued, still rules practical reason when it goes astray.
"Good" is not merely a generic expression for whatever anyone may happen to
want,5 0 for if this were the case there would not be a single first principle but
as many first principles as there are basic commitments, and each first principle
would provide the major premise for a different system of rules. Still, if "good"
denoted only moral goods, either wrong practical judgments could in no way

45 LOrrTIN, op. cit. supra note 3,
"law of nature" a further word 46DE LEGIBUS II, 7, 11.
47 Id. at II, 7.

at

75, points out that Aquinas will add to the expression

e.g., "precept" -

to express strict obligation.

48 S. T. 1-2, q. 100, a. 1, c.

49 See DE MALO q. 3, a. 9, ad 7.
50A. G. SERTILLANGES, O.P., LA PHILOSOPHIE MORALE DE SAINT THOMAS D'AQUIN
(Paris, 1946), seems to fall into this mistaken interpretation.
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issue from practical reason or the formula we are examining would not in reality
express the first principle of practical reason.
Aquinas mentions this point in at least two places. In one he explains that
for practical reason, as for theoretical reason, it is true that false judgments occur.
Yet even though such judgments originate in first principles, their falsity is not
due to the principles so much as to the bad use of the principles. 51 Similarly
he explains in another place that the power of first principles is present in practical misjudgment, yet the defect of the judgment arises not from the principles
52
but from the reasoning through which the judgment is formed.
Just as the principle of contradiction is operative even in false judgments,
so the first principle of practical reason is operative in wrong evaluations and
decisions. First principles do not sanction error, but of themselves they set only
limited requirements. As a disregard of the principle of contradiction makes
discourse disintegrate into nonsense, so a disregard of the first principle of practical reason would make action dissolve into chaotic behavior. The insane sometimes commit violations of both principles within otherwise rational contexts,
but erroneous judgment and wrong decision need not always conflict with first
principles. Hence first principles must be supplemented by other principles and
by a sound reasoning process if correct conclusions are to be reached. The first
practical principle, as we have seen, requires only that what it directs have
intentionality toward an intelligible purpose. The possible underived ends are
indicated by the fundamental inclinations which ground appropriate precepts.
"Good" in the first principle refers with priority to these underived ends, yet
by itself the first principle cannot exclude ends presented in other practical judgments even if their derivation is unsound.
Assumption of a group of principles inadequate to a problem, failure to
observe the facts, or error in reasoning can lead to results within the scope of
first principles but not sanctioned by them. The first precept directs us to direct
our action toward ends within human power, and even immoral action in part
fulfills this precept, for even vicious men act for a human good while accepting
the violation of more adequate human good. The good which is the object of
pursuit can be the principle of the rational aspects of defective and inadequate
efforts, but the good which characterizes morally right acts completely excludes
wrong ones.
After observing these two respects in which the mistaken interpretation unduly
restricts the scope of the first principle of practical reason, we may note also
that this principle as Aquinas understands it is not merely a principle of imperative judgments. Rather, it is primarily a principle of actions. Aquinas thinks
of law as'a set of principles of practical reason related to actions themselves just
as the principles of theoretical reason are related to conclusions.53 Law is not
a constraint upon actions which originate elsewhere and which would flourish
better if they were not confined by reason. Law, rather, is a source of actions.
Law makes human life possible. Animals behave without law, for they live by
51 DE VERITATE q. 16, a. 2, ad 6.

52 SUPER LIBROS SENTENTIARUM PETRI LOMBARDi bk. 2, d. 39, q. 3, a. 1, ad 1.
53 S. T. 1-2, q. 90, a. 1, ad 2.
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instinct without thought and without freedom. Man cannot begin to act as
man without law.
The first precept does not say what we ought to do in contradistinction to
what we will do. Opposition between the direction of reason and the response
of will can arise only subsequent to the orientation toward end expressed in, the
first principle. One whose practical premise is, "Pleasure is to be pursued,"
might reach the conclusion, "Adultery ought to be avoided," without this prohibition becoming a principle of his action. But the first principle of practical
reason cannot be set aside in this manner, as we have seen, and so it cannot
represent an imposition contrary to the judgment that actually informs our
choice.54 The first principles of practical reason are a source not only for judgments of conscience but even for judgments of prudence; while the former can
remain merely speculative and ineffectual, the latter are the very structure of
virtuous action. 55
Throughout history man has been tempted to suppose that wrong action
is wholly outside the field of rational control, that it has no principle in practical
reason. Naturalism frequently has explained away evildoing, just as some psychological and sociological theories based on determinism now do. No less subversive of human responsibility, which is based on purposive- and, therefore,
rational - agency, is the existentialist notion that morally good and morally
bad action are equally reasonable, and that a choice of one or the other is
equally a matter of arational arbitrariness. Aquinas's understanding of the first
principle of practical reason avoids the dilemma of these contrary positions.
The first principle of morally good action is the principle of all human action,
but bad action fulfills the requirement of the first principle less perfectly than
good action does. If the first principle of practical reason were Do morally good
acts, then morally bad acts would fall outside the order of practical reason; if
Do morally good acts nevertheless were the first precept of natural law, and
morally bad acts fell within the order of practical reason, then there would be
a domain of reason outside natural law. However, since the first principle is
Good is to be done and pursued, morally bad acts fall within the order of practical reason, yet the principles of practical reason remain identically the principles
of natural law. More than correct principles are required, however, if reason
is to reach its appropriate conclusion in action toward the good.
The mistaken interpretation of Aquinas's theory of natural law, with its
restrictive understanding of the scope of the first practical principle, suggests
that before reason comes upon the scene, that whole broad field of action lies
open before man, offering no obstacles to his enjoyment of an endlessly rich
and satisfying life, but that cold reason with its abstract precepts successively
marks section after section of the field out of bounds, progressively enclosing the
submissive subject in an ever-shrinking pen, while those who act at the promptings
of uninhibited spontaneity range freely over all the possibilities of life. The
54 For the notion of judgment forming choice see id. at q. 13, a. 3.
55 DE VERITATE q. 17, a. 2; S. T. 2-2, q. 47, a. 6. For a comparison between judgments

of prudence and those of conscience see my paper, The Logic of Moral judgment, 26
PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION 67-76, ,esp. p.
70, n. 7 (1962).
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true understanding of the first principle of practical reason suggests on the
contrary that the alternative to moral goodness is an arbitrary restriction upon
the human goods which can be attained by reasonable direction of life. The
first principle of practical reason directs toward ends which make human action
possible; by virtue of the first principle are formed precepts that represent every
aspect of human nature. Together these principles open to man all the fields in
which he can act; rational direction insures that action will be fruitful and
that life will be as productive and satisfying as possible. Whatever man may
achieve, his action requires at least a remote basis in the tendencies that arise
from human nature. Similarly, actual being does not eliminate unrealized possibilities by demanding that they be not only self-consistent but also consistent
with what already is; rather, it is partly by this demand that actual being grounds
possibility.
IV
The mistaken interpretation of Aquinas's theory of natural law considers
natural law precepts to be a set of imperatives. In this section I wish to show
both that the first principle does not have primarily imperative force and that
it is really prescriptive. The distinction between these two modes of practical
discourse often'is ignored, and so it may seem that to deny imperative force
to the primary precept is to remove it from practical discourse altogether and
to transform it into a merely theoretical principle. Hence I shall begin by
emphasizing the practical character of the principle, and then I shall proceed
to clarify its lack of imperative force. 5 6
56 Even those interpreters who usually can be trusted tend to fall into the mistake of
considering the first principle of practical reason as if it were fundamentally theoretical.
Lottin, for instance, suggests that the first assent to the primary principle is an act of
theoretical reason. At first it appears, he says, simply as a truth, a translation into moral
language of the principle of identity. A formula of the first judgment of practical reason
might be "That which is good, is good- i.e., desirable," or "The good is that which is to
be done, the evil is that which is to be avoided." ODON LOTTIN, O.S.B., 1 PRINCIPES DE
MORALE 22, 122 (Louvain, 1946).
Significant in these formulations are the "that which (ce qui)" and the double "is,"
for these expressions mark the removal of gerundive force from the principal verb of the
sentence. Thus Lottin makes the precept appear as much as possible like a theoretical
statement expressing a peculiar aspect of the good - namely, that it is the sort of thing
that demands doing. Sertillanges also tries to understand the principle as if it were a
theoretical truth equivalent to an identity statement. Among his formulations are: "That
which is to be done is to be done," and: "The good is an end worth pursuing." SERTILLANOES, op. cit. supra note 50, at 102, 109.
Many other authors could be cited: e.g., Stevens, op. cit. supra note 8, at 199. They
wish to show that the first principle really is a truth, that it really is self-evident. This
desire leads them to forget that they are dealing with a precept, and so they try to treat
the first principle of practical reason as if it were theoretical. They ignore the peculiar
character of practical truth and they employ an inadequate notion of self-evidence. There
is a constant tendency to reduce practical truth to the more familiar theoretical truth and
to think of underivability as if it were simply a matter of conceptual identity. These same
difficulties underlie Maritain's effort to treat the primary precept as a truth necessary by
virtue of the predicate's inclusion of the intelligibility of the subject rather than the
reverse. NEUF LErONS SUR LES NOTIONS PREMIERES DE LA PHILOSOPHIE MORALE 158160 (Paris, 1951).
Maritain recognizes that "is to be" cannot be derived from the meaning of "good"
by analysis.

Thinking that the practical principle must be equivalent to a theoretical
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The good which is the subject matter of practical reason is an objective
possibility, and it could be contemplated. But in that case the principle that
will govern the consideration will be that agents necessarily act for ends, not that
good is to be done and pursued. For Aquinas, practical reason not only has a
peculiar subject matter, but it is related to its subject matter in a peculiar way,
for practical reason introduces the order it knows, while theoretical reason adopts
the order it finds.5 7 The object of the practical intellect is not merely the actions
men perform, but the good which can be directed to realization, precisely insofar

as that is a mode of truth.5 8 Practical reason is related to the movement of
action as a principle, not as a consequence. 59
Laws are formed by practical reason as principles of the actions it guides just
as definitions and premises are formed by theoretical reason as principles of the
conclusions it reaches.0 A law is an expression of reason just as truly as a
statement is, but a statement is an expression of reason asserting, whereas a law
is an expression of reason prescribing. 6 1 The primary principle of practical
reason, as we have seen, eminently fulfills these characterizations of law. The
principle is formed because the intellect, assuming the office of active principle,
accepts the requirements of that role, and demands of itself that in directing
action it must really direct. The precept that good is to be sought is genuinely
a principle of action, not merely a point of departure for speculation about human
life.
The principles of practical reason belong to a logical category quite different
from that of theoretical statements: precepts do not inform us of requirements;
they express requirements as directions for action. The point of saying that
good is to be pursued is not that good is the sort of thing that has or is this
peculiar property, obligatoriness-a subtle mistake with which G. E. Moore
launched contemporary Anglo-American ethical theory. The point rather is to
issue the fundamental directive of practical reason. "Is to be" is the copula of
the first practical principle, not its predicate; the gerundive is the mode rather
than the matter of law. To know the first principle of practical reason is not
to reflect upon the way in which goodness affects action, but to know a good
in such a way that in virtue of that very knowledge the known good is ordained
toward realization.
But if it is significant that the first principle of practical reason is really a
precept and not merely a theoretical statement, it is less clear but equally important that this principle is not an imperative, as the mistaken interpretation of
Aquinas's theory considers it to be.
truth, he suggests that the opposite relationship obtains. The theoretical character of the
principle for Maritain is emphasized by his first formulation of it as a metaphysical principle applicable to all good and all action. Only secondarily does he consider it a moral
principle applicable to human good and free action. The difference between the two
formulations is only in the content considered, not at all in the mode of discourse.
57 IN LIBROS ETHICORUM AD NicHOMACHUM, lib. 1, lect. 1.
58 S. T. 1, q. 79, a. 11, ad 2: "Objectum intellectus practici est bonum ordinabile ad
opus, sub ratione veri."
59

Id. at ad 1.

60 S. T. 1-2, q. 90, a. 1, ad 2.
61 Id. at q. 92, a. 2, c.
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Of course, so far as grammar alone is concerned, the gerundive form can
be employed to express an imperative. However, Aquinas explicitly distinguishes
between an imperative and a precept expressed in gerundive form. The imperative not only provides rational direction for action, but it also contains motive
force derived from an antecedent act of the will bearing upon the object of the
action. The prescription expressed in gerundive form, on the contrary, merely
offers rational direction without promoting the execution of the work to which
82
reason directs.
To recognize this distinction is not to deny that law can be expressed in
imperative form. At the beginning of his treatise on law, Aquinas refers to his
previous discussion of the imperative.6 3 Human and divine law are in fact not
merely prescriptive but also imperative, and when precepts of the law of nature
were incorporated into the divine law they became imperatives whose violation
is contrary to the divine will as well as to right reason.
Nevertheless, the first principle of practical reason hardly can be understood
in the first instance as an imperative. As we have seen, it is a self-evident principle in which reason prescribes the first condition of its own practical office.
On the one hand, the causality of God is not a principle evident to us. On the
other hand, the operation of our own will is not a condition for the prescription
of practical reason; the opposite rather is the case.
Aquinas's theological approach to natural law primarily presents it as a
participation in the eternal law. This fact has helped to mislead many into
supposing that natural law must be understood as a divine imperative. Of
course, Aquinas holds that God's will is prior to the natural law, since the natural
law is an aspect of human existence and man is a free creation of God. But
Aquinas does not describe natural law as eternal law passively received in man;
he describes it rather as a participation in the eternal law. This participation
is necessary precisely insofar as man shares the grand office of providence in
directing his own life and that of his fellows. 6 4 Every participation is really
distinct from that in which it participates- a principle evidently applicable in
this case, for the eternal law is God while the law of nature is a set of precepts.
From man's point of view, the principles of natural law are neither received
from without nor posited by his own choice; they are naturally and necessarily
known, and a knowledge of God is by no means a condition for forming selfevident principles, unless those principles happen to be ones that especially
62 Id.

at q. 17, a. 1.
63 Id. at q. 90, a. 1, sed contra, ad 3; q. 91, a. 2, ad 2. But these references should
not be given too much weight, since they refer to the article previously cited in which
the distincion is made explicitly. Although arguments based on what the text does not
say are dangerous, it is worth noticing that Aquinas does not define law as an imperative
for the common good, as he easily could have done if that were his notion, but as an
ordinance of reason for the common good etc. Id. at q. 90, a. 4, c.
64 'Donoghue (op. cit. supra note 21) tries to clarify this point, and does in fact
help considerably toward the removal of misinterpretations. Still, his work is marked by
a misunderstanding of practical reason, so that precept is equated with imperative (p. 95)
and will is introduced in the explanation of the transition from theory to practice. (p.
101) FARRELL (op. cit. supra note 40), by a full and careful comparison of Aquinas's
and Suaree's theories of natural law, clarifies the essential point very well, without suggesting
that natural law is human legislation, as O'Donoghue seems to think.
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concern God.65 Moreover, Aquinas simply does not understand the eternal law
itself as if it were an imposition of the divine will upon creation; 66 and even
if he did understand it in this way, no such imposition would count for human
judgment except in virtue of a practical principle to the effect that the divine
will deserves to be followed. Without such a foundation God might compel
behavior but he could never direct human action.

Nor is any operation of our own will presupposed by the first principles of
practical reason. Of course we do make judgments concerning means in accordance with the orientation of our intention toward the end. But our willing of
ends requires knowledge of them, and the directive knowledge prior to the
natural movements of our will is precisely the basic principles of practical reason.
At any rate this is Aquinas's theory. He maintains that there is no willing without prior apprehension. 67 Moreover, the basic principle of desire, natural
inclination in the appetitive part of the soul, is consequent upon prior apprehension, natural knowledge. 6 8 For the will, this natural knowledge is nothing else
than the first principles of practical reason. 69 The precepts of natural law, at
least the first principle of practical reason, must be antecedent to all acts of our
will. There is nothing surprising about this conclusion so long as we understand
law as intelligence ordering (directing) human action toward an end rather
than as a superior ordering (commanding) a subject's performance.
The theory of law is permanently in danger of falling into the illusion that
practical knowledge is merely theoretical knowledge plus force of will. This is
exactly the mistake Suarez makes when he explains natural law as the natural
goodness or badness of actions plus preceptive divine law. 7 0
The way to avoid these difficulties is to understand that practical reason really
does not know in the same way that theoretical reason knows. For practical
65 The point has been much debated despite the clarity of Aquinas's position that natural
law principles are self-evident; Stevens, op. cit. supra note 8, at 201, n. 23, provides some
bibliography.
" Eternal law is "the exemplar of divine wisdom, as directing all actions and movements"
of created things in their progress toward their end. S. T. 1-2, q. 93, a. 1, c. Those
who misunderstand Aquinas's theory often seem to assume, as if it were obvious, that
law is a transient action of an efficient cause physically moving passive objects; for Aquinas,
law always belongs to reason, is never considered an efficient cause, and cannot possibly
terminate in motion. By their motion and rest, moved objects participate in the perfection
of agents, but a caused order participates in the exemplar of its perfection by form and
the consequences of form -consequences
such as inclination, reason, and the precepts
of practical reason. See FARRELL, op. cit. supra note 40, at ch. 4, esp. pp. 98-103.
67 S. T. 1, q. 82, a. 4, ad 3.
6
8 SUPER LMROS SENTENTIARUM PETa LOMBARDI bk. 4, d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 9.
69 Id. at bk. 2, d. 39, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2.
'ODE LEGUOUS, II, 7; FARRELL, op. cit. supra note 40, at 147-155. Even excellent recent
interpreters of Aquinas tend to compensate for the speculative character they attribute
to the first principle of practical reason by introducing an act of our will as a factor in

our assent to it. Lottin, for example, balances his notion that we first assent to the primary
principle as to a theoretical truth with the notion that we finally assent to it with a consent
of the will. Only free acceptance makes the precept fully operative. (Op. cit. supra note
56, at 24.)

Even so accurate a commentator as Stevens introduces the inclination of the

will as a ground for the prescriptive force of the first principle. (Op. cit. supra note 8, at
202-203: "The intellect manifests this truth formally, and commands it as true, for its
own goodness is seen to consist in a conformity to the natural object and inclination of
the will.")
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reason, to know is to prescribe. This is why I insisted so strongly that the first
practical principle is not a theoretical truth. Once its real character as a precept
is seen, there is less temptation to bolster the practical principle with will, and
so to transform it into an imperative, in order to make it relevant to practice.
Indeed, the addition of will to theoretical knowledge cannot make it practical.
This point is precisely what Hume saw when he denied the possibility of deriving
ought from is.
In an interesting passage in an article attacking what he mistakenly considered to be Aquinas's theory of natural law, Kai Nielsen discussed this point
at some length. 7 1 He begins by arguing that normative statements cannot be
derived from statements of fact, not even from a set of factual statements
which comprise a true metaphysical theory of reality. He points out that from
"God wills x," one cannot derive "x is obligatory," without assuming the nonfactual statement: "What God wills is obligatory." He proceeds to criticize
what he takes to be a confusion in Thomism between fact and value, a merging
of disparate categories which Nielsen considers unintelligible. But over and
above this objection, he insists that normative discourse, insofar as it is practical,
simply cannot be derived from a mere consideration of facts. In this part of the
argument, Nielsen clearly recognizes the distinction between theoretical and
practical reasofi on which I have been insisting. He concludes his argument by
maintaining that the factor which differentiates practical discourse is the presence of decision within it.
To such criticism it is no answer to argue that empiricism makes an unnatural
cleavage between facts and values. 7 2 I have tried above to explain how Aquinas
understands tendency toward good and orientation toward end as a dimension
of all action. If every active principle acts on account of an end, then at a
certain time in spring from the weather and our knowledge of nature we can
conclude that the roses ought to be blooming soon. Similarly, from the truth
of the premises and the validity of the reasoning we can say that the conclusion ought to be true. And from the unique properties of the material and the
peculiar engineering requirements we can deduce that titanium ought to be
useful in the construction of supersonic aircraft. But to get moral principles
from metaphysics, it is not from the is of nature to the ought of nature that one
must go. This illation is intelligible to anyone except a positivist, but it is of no
help in explaining the origin of moral judgments. Moreover, it is no solution
to argue that bne can derive the "ought" of moral judgment from the "is" of
ethical evaluation: "This act is virtuous; therefore, it ought to be done." Not
even Hume could object to such a deduction. Precisely the point at issue is this,
that from the agreement of actions with human nature or with a decree of the
divine will, one cannot derive the prescriptive sentence: "They ought to be
done."
-l Op. cit. supra note 11, at 63-68.
Bourke, Natural Law, Thomism - and Professor Nielsen, 5 NATURAL LAW
FORUM 118-119 (1960), in part has recourse to this kind of argument in his response
to Nielsen. Although Bourke is right in noticing that Nielsen's difficulties partly arise from
his positivism, I think Bourke is mistaken in supposing that a more adequate metaphysics
could bridge the gap between theory and practice.
72 Vernon
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Aquinas knew this, and his theory of natural law takes it for granted. Good
is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided, together with the other
self-evident principles of natural law, are not derived from any statements of
fact. They are principles. They are not derived from any statements at all.
They are not derived from prior principles. They are underivable.
The intellect is not theoretical by nature and practical only by education.
To be practical is natural to human reason. Reason is doing its own work when
it prescribes just as when it affirms or denies. The basic precepts of natural
law are no less part of the mind's original equipment than are the evident principles of theoretical knowledge. Ought requires no special act legitimatizing it;
ought rules its own domain by its own authority, an authority legitimate as that
of any is. Of course, one cannot form these principles if he has no grasp upon
what is involved in them, and such understanding presupposes experience. However, one does not derive these principles from experience or from any previous
understanding. Aquinas's position is not: we conclude that certain kinds of
acts should be done because they would satisfy our inclinations or fulfill divine
commands. His position is: we are capable of thinking for ourselves in the
practical domain because we naturally form a set of principles that make possible
all of our actions. Practical principles do not become practical, although they
do become more significant for us, if we believe that God wills them. Nonprescriptive statements believed to express the divine will also gain added meaning
for the believer but do not thereby become practical. For instance, that the
universe is huge is given added meaning for one who believes in creation, but
it does not on that account become a matter of obligation for him, since it
remains a theoretical truth.
Of course, I must disagree with Nielsen's position that decision makes discourse practical. This view implies that human action ultimately is irrational,
and it is at odds with the distinction between theoretical and practical reason.
If practical reason were simply a conditional theoretical judgment together with
verification of the antecedent by an act of appetite, then this position could
be defended, but the first act of appetite would lack any rational principle.7 3
However, the primary principle of practical reason is by no means hypothetical.
It directs that good is to be done and pursued, and it allows no alternative within
the field of action. 74 In fact, the practical acceptance of the antecedent of any
conditional formulation directing toward action is itself an action that presupposes the direction of practical reason toward the good and the end. The
prescription "Happiness should be pursued" is presupposed by the acceptance
of the antecedent "If you wish to be happy," when this motive is proposed as
a rational ground of moral action.
73Bourke does not call Nielsen to task on this point, and in fact (id. at 117)

even

seems to concur in considering practical reason hypothetical apart from an act of will, but
Bourke places the will act in God rather than in our own decision as Nielsen does.
74 The mere fact of decision, or the mere fact of feeling one of the sentiments invoked
by Hume, is no more a basis for "ought" than is any other "is." Hume misses his own
point- that "ought" cannot be derived- and Nielsen follows his master. If some practical principle is hypothetical because there is an alternative to it, only a practical principle
(and ultimately a nonhypothetical practical principle) can foreclose the rational alternative.
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But while I disagree with Nielsen's positive position on this point, I think
that his essential criticism is altogether effective against the position he is
attacking. If one supposes that principles of natural law are formed by examining kinds of action in comparison with human nature and noting their agreement or disagreement, then one must respond to the objection that it is impossible to derive normative judgments from metaphysical speculations. The invocation of a metaphysics of divine causality and providence at this point is no
help, since such a metaphysics also consists exclusively of theoretical truths from
which reason can derive no practical consequences. Of course, if man can know
that God will punish him if he does not act in approved ways, then it does follow
that an effective threat can be deduced from the facts. But no such threat,
whether coming from God or society or nature, is prescriptive unless one applies
to it the precept that horrible consequences should be avoided. I do not deny
that the naked threat might become effective on behavior without reference
to any practical principle. A threat can be effective by circumventing choice
and moving to nonrational impulse. Such a derivation, however, is not at all
concerned with the "ought"; it moves from beginning to end within the realm
of "is."
V
The mistaken interpretation of Aquinas's theory of natural law considers the
first principle to be a major premise from which all the particular precepts of
practical reason are deduced. "Do good," together with "Such an action is
good," leads deductively to "Do that action." If the first principle actually did
function in this manner, all other precepts would be conclusions derived from
it. As we have seen, however, Aquinas maintains that there are many self-evident
principles included in natural law.
It would be easy to miss the significance of the nonderivability of the many
basic precepts by denying altogether the place of deduction in the development
of natural law. Aquinas holds that reason can derive more definite prescriptions
75
from the basic general precepts.
Consequently, that Aquinas does not consider the first principle of the natural
law to be a premise from which the rest of it is deduced must have a special
75S. T. 1-2, q. 91, a. 3, c.; q. 94, i. 4, c. However, a horror of deduction and a
tendency to confuse the process of rational derivation with the whole method of geometry
has led some Thomists- notably, Maritain - to deny that in the natural law there are
rationally deduced conclusions. MAN AND THE STATE 91. Maritain points out that
Aquinas uses the word "quasi" in referring to the prescriptive conclusions derived from
common practical principles. He does not notice that Aquinas uses "quasi" in referring
to the principles themselves; they are "in ratione naturali quasi per se nota." (S. T., 1-2,
q. 100, a. 3, c. "Quasi" need not carry the connotation of fiction which it has in our
usage; .it is appropriate In the theory of natural law where a vocabulary primarily developed
for the discussion of theoretical knowledge is being adapted to the knowledge of practical
reason.) Maritain attributes our knowledge of definite prescriptions of natural law to a
nonconceptual, nonrational knowledge by inclination or connaturality. (Op. cit. at 90-92.

NAus, op. cit. supra note 18, at 142-150, provides a compact and accurate treatment of

the true sense of "knowledge by connaturality" in Aquinas; however, he unfortunately
concludes his discussion by suggesting that the alternative to such knowledge is theoretical.) In fact, Aquinas does not mention inclinations in connection with the derived
precepts, which are -the ones Maritain wants to explain. Rather, Aquinas relates the
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significance. Why, exactly, does Aquinas treat this principle as a basis for the
law and yet maintain that there are many self-evident principles corresponding
to the various aspects of man's complex nature? What difference would it make
if these principles were viewed as so many conclusions derived from the conjunction of the premises "The human good is to be sought" and "Such and
such an action will promote the human good"- premises not objectionable on
the ground that they lead to the derivation of imperatives that was criticized
above?
Lottin proposed a theory of the relationship between the primary principle
and the self-evident principles founded on it. The basic principle is not related
to the others as a premise, an efficient cause, but as a form which differentiates
itself in its application to the different matters directed by practical reason.
Reason transforms itself into this first principle, so that the first principle must
76
be understood simply as the imposition of rational direction upon action.
Lottin's way of stating the matter is attractive, and he has been followed by
others. Sertillanges, for example, apparently was influenced by Lottin when he
remarked that the good in the formulations of the first principle is "a pure form,
as Kant would say." 77 Stevens also seems to have come under the influence,
as when he states, "The first judgment, it may be noted, is first not as a first,
explicit psychologically perceived judgment, but as the basic form of all prac7
tical judgments." s
.J think it would be a mistake, however, to suppose that the first principle
is formal in a way that would separate it from and contrast it with the content
of knowledge. Aquinas assumes no a priori forms of practical reason. The first
principle of practical reason is itself formed through reflexive judgment; this
precept is an object of the intellect's act. To hold otherwise is to deny the
analogy Aquinas maintains between this principle and the first principle of
theoretical reason, for the latter is clearly a content of knowledge.
It is difficult to think about principles. We tend to substitute the more familiar
application for the less familiar principle in itself. Usually we do not need to
think principles by themselves; we call them to mind only to put them to work.
Principles that serve as premises are formed with some self-consciousness. Because such principles are not equally applicable to all contents of experience,
even though they can be falsified by none, we can at least imagine them not to
be true. Practical principles, other than the first one, always can be rejected
in practice, although it is unreasonable to do so. We easily form the mistaken
generalization that all explicit judgments actually formed by us must meet such
conditions. Hence it is understandable that the denial of the status of premise
to the first practical principle should lead to the supposition that it is a pure
form- a denial to it of any status as an object of self-conscious knowledge.
However, to deny the one status is not to suppose the other, for premises and
basic precepts to the inclinations and, as we have seen, he does this in a way which does

not confuse inclination and knowledge or detract from the conceptual status or intelligible
objectivity of the self-evident principles of practical reason.
76 LoTrIN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 79.
11 SERTILLANOGES, op. cit. supra note 50, at 109.
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a priori forms do not exhaust the modes of principles of rational knowledge.
The first principle may not be known with genetic priority, as a premise, but it
is still first known. It enters our practical knowledge explicitly if not distinctly,
and it has the status of a self-evident principle of reason just as truly as do the
precepts enjoining self-preservation and other natural goods. The fact that the
mind cannot but form the primary precept and cannot think practically except
in accordance with it does not mean that the precept exercises its control covertly.
But it requires something extraordinary, such as philosophic reflection, to make
us bring into the focus of distinct attention the principles of which we are conscious whenever we think.
It also is a mistake to suppose that the primary principle is equivalent to
the precept, Reason should be followed, as Lottin seems to suggest. For Aquinas,
right reason is reason judging in accordance with the whole of the natural law.
Reason does not regulate action by itself, as if the mere ability to reason were
a norm. Rather, it regulates action precisely by applying the principles of natural
law. 7 9 Only one among the natural inclinations of man is that based on his
rational nature to act according to rational direction. Like other inclinations,
this one is represented by a specific self-evident precept of the natural law, a
kind of methodological norm of human action. 8 0 As a particular norm, the
injunction to follow reason has specific consequences for right action. One of
these is that differences between practical judgments must have an intelligible
basis - the requirement that provides the principle for the generalization argument and for Kantian ethics. However, the direction of action by reason, which
this principle enjoins, is not the sole human good. It is not equivalent, for
example, to self-preservation, and it is as much a mistake to identify one particular precept as another with the first principle of practical reason. In order
to equate the requirement of. rationality with the first principle of practical reason one would have to equate the value of moral action with human good absolutely. That is what Kant does, and he is only being consistent when he reduces
the status of end in his system to a motive extrinsic to morality except insofar
as it is identical with the motivation of duty or respect for the law.
As I explained above, the primary principle is imposed by reason simply
because as an active principle reason must direct according to the essential condition for any active principle - it must direct toward an end. In issuing
this basic prescription, reason assumes its practical function; and by this assumption reason gains a point of view for dealing with experience, a point of view
that leads all its further acts in the same line to be preceptive rather than merely
speculative. The first practical principle is like a basic tool which is inseparable
from the- job in which the tool is used; it is the implement for making all the
other tools to be used on the job, but none of them is equivalent to it, and so
the basic tool permeates all the work done in that job.81
79 S. T. 1-2, q. 91,
BARDi bk. 2, d. 42, q.

a. 3, ad 2; q. 95, a. 2,
2, a. 5.

c.; SUPER LIBROS SENTENTIARUM PETRi LOM-

so S. T. 1-2, q. 94, a. 4,, c.
81 See QUAESTIO DISPUTATA DE ANIMA, a. 5, for the notion of first principles as instruments which the agent intellect employs in making what follows actually intelligible.
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Because Aquinas explicitly compares the primary principle of practical reason
with the principle of contradiction, it should help us to understand the significance of the relationship between the first principle and other evident principles in practical reason if we ask what importance attaches to the fact that
theoretical knowledge is not deduced from the principle of contradiction, which
is only the first among many self-evident principles of theoretical knowledge.
The principle of contradiction could serve as a common premise of theoretical knowledge only if being were the basic essential characteristic of beings,
if being were what beings are-that is, if being were a definite kind of thing.
Otherwise (and in truth), to know that something is a being, and so subsumable
under being, presupposes the knowledge which that subsumption applies to it.82
The principle of contradiction expresses the definiteness of things, but to be
definite is not to be anything. To be definite is a condition of being anything,
and this condition is fulfilled by whatever a thing happens to be. The principle
of contradiction does not exclude from our thoughts interesting and otherwise
intelligible things; it grounds the possibility of thinking in reference to anything
at all. But the principle of contradiction can have its liberalizing effect on
thought only if we do not mistakenly identify being with a certain kind of being.
-the move which would establish the first principle as a deductive premise.
Something similar holds with regard to the first practical principle. Of
course, "good" in the primary precept is not a transcendental expression denoting all things. Nevertheless, it is like a transcendental in its reference to
all human goods, for the pursuit of no one of them is the unique condition for
human operation, just as no particular essence is the unique condition for being.
The first practical principle does not limit the possibilities of human action; by
determining that action will be for an end this principle makes it possible.
None of the inclinations which ground specific precepts of the natural law,
not even the precept that action should be reasonable, is a necessary condition
for all human action. If the "good" of the first principle denoted precisely the
object of any single inclination, then the object of another inclination either
would not be a human good at all or it would qualify as a human good only
insofar as it was subordinate to the object of the one favored inclination. Philosophers have constructed their systems of ethics weighted in favor of one or
another good precisely for this reason. Yet the first principle of practical reason
does provide a basic requirement for action merely by prescribing that it be
intentional, and it is in the light of this requirement that the objects of all the
inclinations are understood as human goods and established as objectives for
rational pursuit.
The gap between the first principle of practical reason and the other basic
principles, indicated by the fact that they too are self-evident, also has significant
consequences for the acts of the will which follow the basic principles of practical
reason. The will necessarily tends to a single ultimate end, but it does not necessarily tend to any definite good as an ultimate end. We may say that the will
82 GERARD SMITH, S.J., & LoTTIE H. KENDZIERSKI, I THE PHILOSOPHY OF BEING: METAPHYSICS 2-8 (New York, 1961), make the most of such dialectic in order to show the
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naturally desires happiness, but this is simply to say that man cannot but desire
the attainment of that good, whatever it may be, for which he is acting as an
ultimate end.8 3 The desire for happiness is simply the first principle of practical reason directing human action from within the will informed by reason.
Because the specific last end is not determined for him by nature, man is
able to make the basic commitment which orients his entire life. The human
will naturally is nondetermined precisely to the extent that the precept that
good be pursued transcends reason's direction to any of the particular goods
that are possible objectives of human action.8 4 Yet man's ability to choose
the ultimate concrete end for which he shall act does not arise from any absurdity
in human nature and its situation. This ability has its immediate basis in the
multiplicity of ends among various syntheses of which man can choose, together
with the ability of human reason to think in terms of end as such. The latter
ability is evidenced in the first principle of practical reason, and it is the same
ability which grounds the ability to choose. Man's ability to choose his ultimate
end has its metaphysical ground in the spiritual nature of man himself, on the
one hand, and in the transcendent aspect that every end, as a participation in
divine goodness, necessarily includes, on the other.
Hence the good of the primary principle has a certain transcendence, or at
least the possibility of transcendence, in relation to the objects of all the inclinations, which are the goods whose pursuit is prescribed by the other self-evident
principles. Only by virtue of this transcendence is it possible that the end proposed by Christian faith, heavenly beatitude, which is supernatural to man,
should become an objective of genuine human action- that is, of action under
the guidance of practical reason. If the first principle of practical reason restricted
human good to the goods proportionate to nature, then a supernatural end for
human action would be excluded. The relation of man to such an end could
be established only by a leap into the transrational where human action would
be impossible and where faith would replace natural law rather than supplement it. A first principle of practical reason that prescribes only the basic condition necessary for human action establishes an order of such flexibility that it
can include not only the goods to which man is disposed by nature but even
the good to which human nature is capable of being raised only by the aid of
divine grace.
Thus the status Aquinas attributes to the first principle of practical reason
is not withouf significance. This principle is not an imperative demanding
morally good action, and imperatives - or even definite prescriptions - cannot
be derived from it by deduction. Precisely because the first principle does not
specify the direction of human action, it is not a premise in practical reasoning;
other principles are required to determine direction. At the same time, the
83 That the basic precepts of practical reason lead to the natural acts of the will is
clear: SUPER Laaos SENTENTIARUM PETRi LOMBARDi bk. 2, d. 39, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2. See also
Van Overbeke, loc. cit. supra note 3. JosEPH BUCKLEY, S.M., MAN'S LAST END 164-210 (St.
Louis and London, 1950), shows that there is no natural determinate last end for man.
84 G. P. Klubertanz, S.J., The Root of Freedom in St. Thomas's Later Works, 42
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709-716 (1961), examines how Aquinas relates reason and freedom. It is

this "later" resolution that I am supposing here.
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transcendence of the primary precept over all definite goods allows the conjunction of reason with freedom. On this open ground man can accept faith
without surrendering his rationality. This situation reveals the lowliness and the
grandeur of human nature. Man's lowliness is shown by the very weakness of
reason's first principle; by itself this precept cannot guide action, and the instigation of natural inclination and the inspiration of faith are needed to develop
an adequate law for human life. Man's grandeur is shown by the transcendence
of this same principle; it evokes man's possibilities without restricting them, thus
permitting man to determine by his own choice whether he shall live for the
good itself or for some particular good.
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